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injustice in allowing a judgment to remain. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provide for relief within one year after judgment
for excusable neglect. The Rule does not differentiate between
extrinsic fraud and intrinsic fraud. 0 This rule has been construed
liberally in order to do justice where it should be done 5' while maintaining the "delicate adjustment between the desirability of finality
and prevention of injustice. ' 52 Texas would come closer to maintaining justice in cases of this nature by adopting this rule.
Karen J. Ruble

ADMIRALTY-CONFLICT
APPLICABLE

IN

A

OF LAWS-PROVISIONS

So As To ALLOW

RECOVERY

UNITED STATES PORT ON A

OF JONES ACT

To ALIEN SEAMAN INJURED

FOREIGN FLAG VESSEL OWNED AND

By UNITED STATES ALIEN DOMICILIARIES. Hellenic
Lines Limited and Universal Cargo Carriers, Inc. v. Zacharias
Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1969).
CONTROLLED

Zacharias Rhoditis, a Greek seaman, was injured aboard the S. S.

Hellenic Hero while the ship was docking at the Port of New Orleans.
The Hellenic Hero, which flew the Greek ensign and was registered
in the Port of Piraeus, Greece, was owned by a Panamanian corporation that in turn was owned by a Greek corporation. However, 95
per cent of the stock of the Greek corporation was owned by two
residents of the United States, and the corporation had its principal
office in New York. Universal Cargo Carriers, the Panamanian corporation, was a holding company with no operational responsibilities
in connection with the Hero. The real ownership and operational

responsibilities were vested in Hellenic Lines, the corporation organized and existing under the laws of Greece. Hellenic was managed
from the base in New York and was owned almost entirely by Pericles
Callimanopoulos and his son. Callimanopoulos was a Greek citizen
who had resided in the United States since 1945. Seeking compensation for his injuries, Rhoditis brought suit under the Jones Act; the
60 FED. R. CIv. P., 28 U.S.C.A. 60b:

Relief from Judgment or Order
(b) Mistake; Inadvertance; Excusable Neglect; . . . On motion and upon such terms
as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertences, surprise, or excusable neglect; ...
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic) ...
(6) and any other reason justifying operation of judgment.
51 Laguna Royalty Co. v. Marsh, 350 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1965).
52 In re Casco Chemical Co. v. Superintendence Company, Inc., 335 F.2d 645 (5th Cir.
1964).
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trial court held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
awarded damages in the sum of $6,000. Held-Affirmed. The provisions of the Jones Act are applicable so as to allow recovery by an
alien seaman who is injured in a United States port while on a foreign
flag vessel when such vessel is owned and controlled by a United States
alien domiciliary.
The United States Constitution extends the judicial power of the
United States to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.'
Under the Judicial Code the district courts of the United States are
given "original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the states, of
any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors
' 2
in all cases other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
Although the Constitution vests jurisdiction over admiralty cases it
does not provide what substantive law should apply to such cases.3
Federal statutes, however, have set forth substantive law that partially
covers some of the more important admiralty fields. For example, in
1915, Congress passed an omnibus statute captioned "an act to promote the welfare of American seamen in the Merchant Marine of the
as a penalty for
United States; to abolish arrest and imprisonment
4
desertion ...

and to promote the safety at sea."

The above mentioned statute is commonly referred to as the Merchant Marine Act of 1915. The Jones Act, which is a 1920 amendment
to section 20 of the Merchant Marine Act, provides:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages
at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all
statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common
law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a
result of any such personal injury the personal representative of
such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the
right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United
States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the
case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such
actions shall be under the court of the district in which the
defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is
located.5
Prior to the enactment of the Jones Act a seaman had no cause of action
for negligence unless the cause of action could be attributed to the
1 U.S.

CONST., §

art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

2 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (1949).
3 See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, §§
4 Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1164.

1-16 (2d ed. 1957).

546 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1920).
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unseaworthiness of the vessel; an injured seaman was limited to two
remedies: an action for maintenance and cure, and for his wages, at
least so long as the voyage continued and an action for indemnity for
injuries received as a consequence of the unseaworthiness of the vessel.6
Though the remedies that evolved from the enactment of the Jones
Act are quite well defined, the instances or fact situations in which its
substantive provisions are to be applied are quite complex and uncertain. For example, in relation to the term "any seaman" the courts
have had to define the members of such class, and determine which
members out of all persons employed by shipowners throughout the
world, fall into the limited class.7 The courts upon which the jurisdiction over admiralty cases has been conferred are confronted with
a problem that occurs often in admiralty cases, that is, the problem
of determining what substantive law to apply.
Such a problem arose in the landmark case of Lauritzen v. Larsen.,
In Lauritzen, the Supreme Court formulated some general rules that
were intended to stabilize an unpredictable area of the law. In holding
that the Jones Act did not apply so as to allow recovery to Larsen, a
Danish seaman who had signed the ship's articles providing that the
rights of crew members would be governed by Danish law and who was
negligently injured on board a ship of the Danish flag in Havana Harbor, the Supreme Court set forth seven factors to be considered in determining whether the Jones Act is applicable: 9
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

The
The
The
The
The
The
The

place of the wrongful act;
law of the flag;
allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman;
allegiance of the defendant shipowner;
place where the contract of employment was made;
inaccessibility of a foreign forum;
law of the forum.

The factors to be considered in determining the applicability of
the Jones Act having been set forth, the next problem was one of determining the weight to be given to each factor. The "place of the injury"
does not appear to be controlling. It has been held that the mere fact
that an injury occurs in United States waters or in a United States port
does not make the provisions of the Act applicable, nor does the fact
that the injury was incurred outside United States waters preclude
such coverage. 10 The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case
6 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 28 S. Ct. 483, 47 L. Ed. 760 (1903).
7 Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187, 72 S. Ct. 216, 96 L. Ed. 205 (1952);
Hudgins v. Gregory, 219 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1955).
8 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S. Ct. 921, 97 L. Ed. 1254 (1953).
9Id.
10 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S. Ct. 468, 3 L. Ed.
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of Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.," provided the

reasoning for according little weight to the "place of the injury":
[T]he place of injury... does not fit the accommodations that become relevant in fair and prudent regard for the interests of
foreign nations in the regulation of their own ships and their
own nationals.... To impose on ships the duty of shifting from

one standard of compensation to another as the vessel passes the
boundaries of territorial waters would be ... an onerous burden
and without basis in the
..disruptive of international commerce
12

expressed policies of this country.

Although little weight is accorded the "place of the injury", it seems
well settled that the "flag of the vessel" is given the greatest weight of
all the factors used in determining the substantive law to be applied. 3
This may be explained by the existence of a desire on the part of the
courts "to foster the principles of international comity 'and to
achieve' stability in the application of maritime law.' 14 Although the
law of the flag is stressed in determining the substantive law to be
applied, it seems quite clear that the courts will continue to make an
exception to this rule when it is shown that American shipowners
are attempting to evade the provisions of the Jones Act." Thus, where
the flag is shown to be merely one of convenience, the Jones Act will
be applied if other sufficient contacts exist.' 6
It appears that the fact that a seaman is an American citizen is to
be considered an important factor in determining whether the provisions of the Jones Act apply. 1 At the same time, the fact that a seaman
is an alien does not necessarily preclude application of the Act, but
2d 368 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S. Ct. 921, 97 L. Ed. 1254 (1953); The
Paula, 91 F.2d 1001 (2nd Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 750, 58 S. Ct. 270, 82 L. Ed. 580
(1937); Pavlow v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Katelouzos
v. The S.S. Othem, 184 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1960).
11 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S. Ct. 468, 3 L. Ed.
2d 368 (1959).
12 Id.
13 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S. Ct. 921, 97 L. Ed. 1254 (1953); Southern Cross
Steamship Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960); Shahid v. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels
Rederi, 236 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Prol v. Holland-America Line, 234 F. Supp. 530
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Voyiatzis v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Markakis v. Liberian S/S The Mparmpa Christos, 161 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Catherall v. Cunard S.S. Co., 101 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
14 Shahid v A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi, 236 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
15 53 Mien. L. REV. 100 (1954).
16 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S. Ct. 921, 97 L. Ed. 1254 (1953); Gerradin v.
United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 642, 53 S. Ct. 92, 77
L. Ed. 556 (1932); Southern Cross Steamship Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960);
Pavlow v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Voyiatzis v.
National Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Zielinski v.
Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, 113 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
17 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S. Ct. 921, 97 L. Ed. 1254 (1953); Uravic v. F.
Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234, 51 S.Ct. 111, 75 L. Ed. 312 (1931); Prol v. Holland-America Line,
234 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Pavlow v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp.
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must be weighed with the other factors or contacts present, if any.',
Thus, "allegiance or domicile of the injured" is to be accorded substantial weight.
The "allegiance of the defendant shipowner" is to be accorded substantial weight. 19 The importance of this factor is best exemplified by
reference to the Court's opinion in Lauritzen, wherein the Court
stated:
. . . it is common knowledge that in recent years a practice has

grown, particularly among American shipowners, to avoid stringent shipping laws by seeking foreign registration eagerly offered
by some countries. Confronted with such operations, our courts on
occasion have pressed beyond the formalities of more or less nomshipowners
inal foreign registration to enforce against American
20
the obligations which our law places upon them.
Thus, the courts will, or should, determine ownership of the vessel
and weigh such factor accordingly.
As to the last three factors set forth in the Lauritzen opinion, "the
place where the contract of employment was made," "the inaccessibility of a foreign forum," and "the law of the forum," it suffices to
say that such factors are to be accorded less weight than the factors
heretofore mentioned.

21

Since 1953, various combinations of all seven factors have been
considered by the courts throughout the United States. It is fairly
safe to say, however, that all of the possible combinations of the
factors set forth in Lauritzen have yet to be considered, and, as a case
presents a different combination, new law evolves. The principal case
presents such a combination.
In Hellenic Lines Limited, the court, in considering the factors set
forth in the Lauritzen case, pointed out that the factor said to be of
cardinal importance is the law of the flag and that it must prevail
unless some heavy counterweight is present. 22 Here, the court found
that heavy counterweight present in the fact that the ship was, for all
commercial purposes, owned and operated by a United States domicil320 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Shorter v. Bermuda and West Indies S.S. Co., 57 F.2d 313 (S.D.N.Y.
1932); Mahoney v. International Elevating Co., 23 F.2d 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1927); Zarowitch v.
F. Jarka Co., 21 F.2d 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1927).
18 The Paula, 91 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 750, 58 S. Ct. 270, 82
L. Ed. 580 (1937); The Fletero v. Arias, 206 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1953).
19Anastasiadis v. S.S. Little John, 346 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1965); Volkenburg v. Nederland-Amerik/Stoom v. Maats, 336 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1964); Bartholomew v. Universe
Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959); Brillis v. Chandris (U.S.A.) Inc., 215 F. Supp.
520 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
20 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S. Ct. 921, 97 L. Ed. 1254 (1953); Southern Cross
Steamship Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960).
21 Southern Cross Steamship Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960).
22 Hellenic Lines Limited v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1969).
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iary who had resided in the United States since 1945 and who maintained his principal place of business here. In support of its finding,
the court pointed out that United States shipowners have been held
liable in similar instances and, that, since alien domiciliaries of the
United States are accorded the same rights and liabilities as United
States citizens, they too should be made to comply with the provisions
23
of the Jones Act, which are applicable to all United States shipowners.
The court in adopting the dissenting opinion in Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp.,2 4 which involved the same defendants as the
instant case and same fact situation, with the exception that the injury
was incurred while the ship was berthed at a pier in Brooklyn, stated:
So, unless the same obligations that United States law imposes on
shipowners who are United States citizens are imposed on resident
alien shipowners, a resident alien shipowner like Callimanopoulos
will be able to enjoy the considerable benefits of lawful permanent resident alien status in this country without being subject to
the duties and obligations exacted of an otherwise similarly2 situ5
ated competitive shipowner who is an American shipowner.
The court in Hellenic Lines Limited "pierced the corporate veil"
to consider a foreign corporation as if it were an American corporation
and held that the ship's flag was merely one of convenience, as had been
done in so many instances involving American shipowners in similar
situations. 2 6 In justifying such action, the court cited Bartholomew v.
Universe Tankships, Inc., in which the court said:
This action is essential unless the purposes of the Jones Act are
to be frustrated by American shipowners intent upon evading
their obligations under the law by the simple expedient of incorporating in 27a foreign country and registering their vessels under a
foreign flag.

Therefore, as the court pointed out, the same frustration of the Jones
Act should be prevented when the shipowner is a resident alien; in
other words, no distinction should be made between American ship28
owners and shipowners who are resident aliens of the United States.
In contrasting Hellenic Lines Limited, decided in the Fifth Circuit,
and the Tsakonites case, decided in the Second Circuit, the former is
more in line with the legal authorities of the day. Perhaps the different
conclusions of the two circuits may be attributed first of all, to their
23 Id.
24 Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1007, 87 S. Ct. 1348, 18 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1966).
25 Id.
26 Cases cited note 16 supra.
27 263 F.2d 437, 442 (2d Cir. 1959).
28 Hellenic Lines Limited v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1969).
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different interpretations of the Lauritzen case. In Hellenic Lines
Limited, the court took the position that the Lauritzen opinion is authoritative only on the narrow issue actually decided, and that the
seven factors set out in Lauritzen are neither "exclusive nor immutable. ' 29 For example, the court points out that it has been held
that an eighth contact should be considered-the shipowner's base
of operations.3 0 On the other hand, the court of the Second Circuit
has held that the Jones Act and general maritime law of the United
States do not apply to an accident occurring in an American port causing injury to a foreign seaman on a ship owned by a foreign corporation.31 In Tsakonites the principal shareholder or owner, though a
foreign citizen, resided in the United States and operations of the
ship were controlled from the United States. The court evidently
interpreted Lauritzen as conclusive; especially that portion of the
court's opinion which makes reference to the "law of the flag" as being
32
the controlling factor.
Secondly, it seems as though the court in Tsakonites failed to recognize the significance of the fact that the interests in the foreign regigtered ship were owned by a resident alien of the United States. From
a standpoint of competition in commerce, there seems to be little doubt
that the federal government has the power to regulate such competition; 33 and to say that to allow a resident alien, who enjoys the same
rights as an American citizen, to circumvent such duties imposed by
the Act is not detrimental or destructive to the competitive standards
present among United States shipowners seems to be without foundation.
It seems that the reason for refusing application of the Jones Act in
cases such as Tsakonites is the desire for the freedom of commerce and
for the avoidance of friction and retaliation between foreign nations
and the United States. 34 Whether an alien seaman can invoke the
provisions of the Jones Act in such a situation must be determined
by weighing the points of contact of the incident, against the national
law sought to be applied. 35 In considering the above reasoning, can it
be said that a foreign country had a substantial competing interest
in the regulation of The Hero? Can it be said that by holding the
owners of The Hero, who have resided in the United States for over
29 Id.

Id. Citing: Pavlow v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 368 F.2d 426 (2d cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1007, 87 S.Ct. 1348, 18 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1966).
32 Id.
33 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 18; Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 869, 90 L.
Ed. 1045 (1946).
34 102 U. PA. L. REv. 237 (1953).
35 Anastasiadis v. S.S. Little John, 46 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1965).
30
31
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